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ANATOMICAL GIFTS IN ILLINOIS
DON E. WHEELER*
ECENT HEART transplant operations have captured the attention
of the world. Not nearly as much interest has been generated by
kidney transplants, though they too were initially unique and
startling. Apparently, public identification of the heart as a symbol of
life itself has drawn attention to heart transplant operations, thereby
stimulating speculation and reconsideration of transplant operations of
all kinds.1 Another dramatic development has been the multiple dona-
tion of several organs by one donor for the benefit of several patients
in simultaneous transplant operations. Doctors in Houston, Texas, on
August 31, 1968, removed the heart, one lung, and both kidneys from
a donor and transplanted the organs in four other patients.2 Earlier,
on May 3, 1968, doctors in Loma Linda, California, with parental con-
sent, removed the kidneys, spleen, and much of the skin of an eleven-
year old boy killed in a traffic accident, thus giving the means of life
to four other patients.3
Our reaction is to marvel at these medical accomplishments, to ap-
plaud them, and to hope both for further refinement in technique and
for greater accessibility of such operations. At the same time, we must
realize that these accomplishments depend upon a legal environment
for their furtherance. We must inquire whether existing laws in Illinois
are conducive to the advancement of medicine in the field of transplan-
tation. As a practical beginning, let us address the legal problems of a
surgeon who wishes to undertake a transplant operation and who must
first obtain the organ to be transplanted from a deceased patient. To
see the range of possible cases, we should examine at least four situa-
tions. First, let us consider the case in which there is an unexpected
* MR. WHEELER is associated with Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz and Masters,
Chicago, Illinois. He received his A.B. from Yale and his LL.B. from Harvard. This
article is based on a paper presented to the DePaul University Estate Planning Council
on May 21, 1968. It has been revised to take account of later developments.
1 For comment on the public's involvement, see Appel, Ethical and Legal Questions
Posed by Recent Advances in Medicine, 205 J. AMER. MED. Ass. 513 (1968).
2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1968, at 24, col. 1.
3 Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1968, at 14, col. 4.
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death and relatives either cannot be located or do not exist. Next, we
should consider the case in which death seems imminent and relatives
are available. What courses are open to the doctor? Third, assuming
that there is ample opportunity for planning by the prospective donor,
what steps can be taken in estate planning to clarify the legal situation?
Fourth and finally, how could the legal environment for transplants in
Illinois be improved by enactment of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act?
DEATH WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY FOR PLANNING
How should a lawyer advise the surgeon who must know immediately
whether he may use organs or tissue from a recently deceased hospital
patient? What laws bear on the questions involved?
In some cases it may be that the controlling law is to be found in
the statutes concerned with abandoned bodies. In Illinois there is a
statute entitled "Use of Bodies of Deceased Persons to Promote Medi-
cal Science." 4 It empowers coroners, sheriffs, and other public officials
to release a body only to physicians and surgeons or to medical and
mortuary schools, and only if the body would otherwise be required
to be buried at public expense. The body must be used within the state
"for advancement of medical, anatomical, biological or mortuary sci-
ence." ' There are other limitations: no delivery can be made if other
disposition of the body is directed by will or other written instrument;
proper notice must be given to the relatives or guardians and the body
is to be surrendered to them for burial if they ask for it; a school is
directed to furnish the body to students for scientific study. Despite
these limitations, it is arguable that, in some cases, organs could be
taken from the body for transplantation, construing that as "advance-
ment of medical science."
Before proceeding under the statute discussed above, the surgeon
should be certain that he is not faced with a case in which the coroner
has jurisdiction. Where the death was violent, accidental, incidental to
abortion, was under suspicious circumstances, where drug addiction
was involved, or where there was no attending physician, the coroner
is given control of the body by statute.0 Where the cause of death can-
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 19-22 (1967). For a discussion of the "abandoned body"
statutes, see Comment, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, 19 Oiio
ST. L.J. 455, 459 (1958).
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 19 (1967).
0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 31, § 10 (1967).
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not be established except by means of an autopsy, the- coroner is em-
powered to hold an autopsy.7
The time factor can become a prohibitive condition for some types
of transplant operations. Critical organic tissue, such as the heart, kid-
ney, lung and liver must be removed from a deceased donor within
minutes of death. It must be transplanted within hours. Certain non-
critical tissue, such as that in the skin and cornea, can be removed
after a greater lapse of time and still be used. But there must usually
be sufficient time to determine whether the organ involved is infected
by a disqualifying disease, The surgical team needs time to prepare.
Further, there must be time to ascertain the compatibility of blood and
tissue.8 In addition to considerations of time, an attempt to proceed
to remove organs for a transplant operation in the case where the cor-
oner has jurisdiction may be inadvisable in that it interferes with those
functions the coroner is charged with performing. Questions of crimi-
nal responsibility, as in homicide and manslaughter, and questions of
civil liability may depend for their solution upon the coroner's work.
A proper analysis of the cause of death may require an intact corpse.
Related to this is the problem of prosecution for homicide, where the
victim becomes a heart-donor after entering the hospital. The prosecu-
tion may be confounded, depending upon the definition of death which
is applied. Was the cause of death the homicidal assault or the loss
of a heart? The definition of death for transplantation purposes must
be acknowledged for criminal law purposes as well. Until a new uniform
standard is reached, the problems will remain. One physician-lawyer
has publicly stated that where the coroner has taken charge, or should
take charge, no transplantation should be contemplated.9
Thus, it becomes obvious that a surgeon may be severely limited in a
situation where there has been no opportunity for planning. He may
have the problem of determining whether there are relatives of the
deceased or not. He may choose not to proceed where the coroner may
be concerned. Leaving these conditions aside, there may be trouble-
some administrative rules and ordinances to contend with.' 0
7 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 31, § 10.2 (1967).
8 Conditions for successful transplantation of some organs and tissue are outlined in
Couch, Curran, and Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation, 271 NEw
ENGLAND J. MED. 691 (1964).
9 Address by Dr. Cyril Wecht, Legal Aspects of Organ Transplants, Society of Hospital
Attorneys, in Chicago, Illinois, June 28, 1968.
10 Physicians concerned with transplantation must be aware of Rules and Regulations
1969]
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It has been suggested that a coroner could remove organs for trans-
plantation incidental to his conduct of the autopsy." This seems a most
dubious proposition which would surely expose the coroner to risks of
liability. The primary function of the coroner's autopsy is to determine
the cause of death. Any additional activity would be beyond the scope
of his authority."
An autopsy conducted pursuant to the coroner's authority is on a
different footing from an autopsy conducted with the consent of the
deceased or a relative.13 Such consent can be granted and it could
encompass the removal of organs for transplantation. If the physician
exceeds the scope of the consent, he can be liable in damages, as it
goes without saying that he can be liable where he proceeds in the
absence of consent. 4 The courts will protect the sensibilities of those
who are entitled to have the body for the purpose of burial; while the
monetary damages awarded are not usually great, the real sanction is
the harm done to the reputation of the physician who exceeds consent.
"Those who are entitled to have the body for the purpose of burial"
-this is the crucial point both in determining who has control of the
deceased body and its parts and in determining whose consent the sur-
for the Transportation and Disposal of the Dead promulgated April 12, 1962 by the
Illinois Department of Public Health. Rule 8.01 imposes restrictions on holding or
moving a body. A funeral director must obtain a Permit for Disposition of Dead
Human Body. The Permit can authorize use of the body for teaching purposes with
provision for eventual final disposition. Such a Permit applies in the case of a medical
school, mortuary school or a hospital or where the body is to be preserved as a medical
specimen. Transplantation seems to be no exception to the rules. Obtaining a Permit may
take time.
Further, physicians in Chicago must comply with CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCES ch. 93,
§ 10 (1939), which prevents movement of a body or a part without permission from
the Board of Health. Removals for limited purposes are allowed on telephone permission
obtained from the Board by a funeral director as outlined by the Board of Health in
Diary and Year Book 1968, Funeral Directors Services Association of Greater Chicago,
(Leach ed.), at 13-14.
Manifestly, both the ordinance and the rule should be amended to encompass trans-
plantation so that the protective measures provided can be accomplished without
hampering transplant operations.
11 Vestal, Taber, and Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue Homotransplanta-
tion, 18 U. DET. L.J. 171, 189-92 (1954).
12 This is the position asserted by the writer of the Comment, supra note 4, at 465.
To the same effect is Wasmuth and Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human
Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 442, 459 (1965).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.12 (1967) provides authority to physicians to perform
an autopsy where consent is obtained.
14E.g., Eastin v. Ochsner Clinic and Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 200 So. 2d 371
(La. App. 1967), aff'd, 251 La. 34, 202 So.2d 652 (1967).
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geon must obtain. Such determinations have been made by common
law.1" For the present, it is important to note a statement of policy by
the legislature with regard to these persons which is contained in the
act on coroners. The pertinent language reads, in part:
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this Act it is declared that
the public policy of the State is as follows:
That as soon as may be consistent with the performance of his duties under
this act the coroner shall release the body of the decedent to the decedent's next
of kin, personal representative, friends, or to person designated in writing by the
decedent or to the funeral director selected by such persons, as the case may be,
for burial, and none of the duties or powers of coroners enumerated in this act
shall be construed to interfere with or control the right of such persons to the cus-
tody and burial of the decedent upon completion of the coroner's investigation.' 6
This statement of policy clarifies the existing common law and brings
us logically to the second of the aforesaid situations: the case in which
there is limited opportunity for planning and in which relatives are
available.
DEATH AFTER LIMITED OPPORTUNITY FOR PLANNING
Let us suppose that a patient is dying and his relatives are available
to the surgeon. How should the doctor proceed in order to assure legal
protection? Why may he rely upon the consent of relatives immediately
after death?
The first principle to understand is that a decedent's next of kin have
a right to possession of the body in order to bury it properly. This is
made clear in an Illinois appellate court decision, Fischer's Estate v.
Fischer.7 The facts in Fischer are not helpful, since the case is con-
cerned with the right of disinterment and reinterment, but the dicta
and premises of the court make clear what is taken to be the law in
Illinois. The court's position is consistent with the declaration of policy
noted above in the act on coroners. The court quotes from an early
landmark case with approval:
15For the general background, see JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS 41-55 (2d ed.
1950), and Note, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues to Medical Science,
21 VAND. L. REV. 352, 356-59 (1968). The note alludes to cases which have held that
there are under various circumstances the following rights with respect to a dead
body: the right to possession of it for burial, the right to recover damages for mutila-
tion, the right to determine the manner and place of burial, and the right to permit
autopsy pursuant to life insurance contract.
1ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 31, § 10.7 (1967).
17 1 Ill. App. 2d 528, 117 N.E.2d 855 (1954).
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While it may be true there is no right of property in a dead body, in the
ordinary sense, it is also true that the nearest relatives of the deceased are and
have been in all ages, so far as known, except under ecclesiastical law, recognized
as legally entitled to its custody, to lay it away in burial. It is the duty no less
than the right of such relatives to protect it from unnecessary violation, and
any infringement upon that right, except where made necessary for the discovery
and punishment of crime, violates the tenderest sentiments of humanity.18
It follows from this fiat that in order to clarify the right of the sur-
viving spouse and the next of kin to give consent which is effective to
permit the use of the cadaver, the right to bury must include the right
of disposition in a variety of appropriate ways-especially donation of
the body and its parts. The right to bury must simply be construed as
a right of disposition. There is some doubt that this can be done. 9
None of the cases dealing with the right of burial are addressed to
the problems of transplantation. We must therefore generalize and
draw inferences in a different context from that in which the rules are
expressed. One writer, after extensive survey of the cases, has sum-
marized the rights of the next of kin as follows:
1. The person who has possession of the body holds the same in trust for those
who are charged with the duty of burial or are privileged to exercise the right
thereof.
2. The person charged with the duty of burial or the person who has the prior
privilege thereof is entitled to the possession of the body for the purpose of
interment.
3. Such person is entitled to possession in such a manner as not to delay,
impede, or prevent interment.
'
81d. at 531-32, 117 N.E.2d at 857. The quotation is from Palenzke v. Bruning, 98
Ill. App. 644 (1901). Palenzke was a case in which a coroner arrived late, interfered
with the burial arrangements in order to conduct an autopsy and then failed to
return the corpse intact. The court awarded damages to the decedent's parents.
As a contrast to the Palenzke court's assumptions about the preference to bury the
dead, compare Bi6rck, When is Death? 1968 Wis. L. REv. 484 (1968). "The problem
with death is that it usually leaves a dead body behind. This fact causes many different
reactions among humans. Some feel nothing, or next to nothing, before the dead body.
Others retain a profound attachment to the body." Id.
I"l Comment, supra note 4, at 468-469: "Recent cases have loosely referred to the
right of the kin to 'dispose of the body'; the authors of the Homotransplantation
article preceptably change from writing of 'burial' to writing of 'disposition.' There is
no case authority in point and no apparent legal principle with which to buttress
the conclusion that disposition by donating to science is the equivalent of according
the common law right of decent burial." The. writer goes on. to conclude that the next
of kin probably do not have an absolute right to donate the decedent's remains for
medical purposes, thereby overriding -the common human wish to be buried.. Such a
deficiency in the law is a serious drawback to medical progress. Failing the decedent's
pre-mortem consent, there is some doubt whether his survivors can in all events
donate the body or its parts. This question is merely clouded further by the old prin-
ciple often found in the cases that there is no "property" right in a dead body.
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4. Such person is likewise entitled to possession of the body in the same con-
dition it was in when death occurred.20
With the emphasis placed upon the right of burial, we should next
note the order of priority among the persons who may be entitled to
possession. In Fischer the rule is stated thusly: "Right of possession of
a dead body in the absence of any testamentary disposition belongs
usually to the husband or wife or next of kin."'"
The important words are "in the absence of any testamentary disposi-
tion." The majority rule solely regarding disposal of the body after
death appears to be that the decedent's wishes are entitled to "respect-
ful consideration" and" substantial weight." 2 In some cases the testa-
tor's wishes have not prevailed, as, for example, where he attempted to
assign the right of disposition to a non-relative in derogation of the
right of his surviving spouse. 3 Through a long evolution, the priority
is presently determined as follows: first the wishes of the testator
(within limits), then of the surviving spouse, then of the children,
then of a parent, and so on, depending upon the facts of the case.2 4
- With the priorities in mind, it is important to note next that, as a
matter of theory, we are talking about an action sounding in tort. In
his section on intentional infliction of mental distress, Prosser points
out that many courts have allowed damages in cases involving mis-
handling of dead bodies.25 Once the remedy for interference with the
right of possession of a dead body is seen to be in tort law, it is then
clear that those who exercise the right can give valid consent to its
infringement. The practical consequence is that such consent is a
defense for the surgeon who relies upon it.
26
20JACKSON, supra note 15, at 142-43.
21 Supra note 17 at 531, 117 N.E.2d at 857, quoting People v. Harvey, 286 Ill. 593 at
601, 122 N.E. 138 at 141 (1919).
22 22 AM. JUJR. 2d Dead Bodies § 12 (1965).
23 Id., citing Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900).
24 JAcKsON, supra note 15.
25,"In most of these cases the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious 'property
right' to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while the decedent
was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one purpose of burial, and
not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It
seems reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out of thin air to
meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which
are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer." PROSSER,
TORTS 51 (3d ed. 1964).
26 This conceptual basis is developed at more length in Packel, Spare Parts for the
Human Engine, 37 PA. B.Q. 71 (1965).
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We can now evaluate the position of the surgeon in the case where
the relatives are known and are available and willing to donate the
remains for the cause of medical science. The next of kin have the
capacity, if legally competent, to give consent permitting the surgeon
to proceed with a transplant operation.
A theme we have thus far left undeveloped is the power of the testa-
tor or an intestate decedent to give a valid consent well in advance of
death. Let us now turn to these questions and examine them in the
context of a case in which the emphasis is on inter vivos planning.
What steps in estate planning should be accomplished?
INTER VIVOS PLANNING FOR DISPOSITION
Thus far we have made the cases difficult by postulating that death
was imminent or had already occurred and there was little time for
reaction. Suppose, however, that there is time to make proper plans.
This could occur where the patient involved has a terminal illness or
where a person in good health wishes to benefit medical science by a
bequest of his body. 7 What are the steps necessary to effectuate a
valid gift of a person's body or organs?
In Illinois the legislature has provided special statutory authority
regarding the gifts of organs or bodies in the Illinois Probate Act,
section 42a. The section is entitled "Gift of Body" and was enacted in
1959, well before the most notable recent developments in transplanta-
tion:
1. Every person of testamentary capacity may give by will or other written
instrument executed during that person's lifetime, the whole or any part of his
body to a charitable, educational or research institution, university, college, State
Director of Public Health, State Director of Public Welfare, legally licensed
hospital or any other organization intended and equipped to distribute human
bodies or parts thereof, either for use as such institution, organization, university,
27 On the need for bodies, see Schools Report Cadaver Shortage, 200 J. AMER. MED.
Ass. 38 (1967). Gifts of organs from living donors, as between twins in the kidney
transplant operations, are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the
key is to have fully informed, fully voluntary, written consent. See Plante, An Analysis
of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (1968). Professor Plante illuminates
the distinction between the cases in which a physician exceeds the scope of the consent
given and the cases in which the physician fails to provide sufficient information upon
which to base the decision to give consent. See Note, supra note 15, for a development
of the view that the extraordinary risks involved in transplant operations call for a
higher standard of understanding on the part of a recipient in giving consent. For the
same reason, the writer of the note would require a higher standard in informing a
living donor of the risks involved, for instance, in a kidney transplant.
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college, Director or hospital may see fit, or for use as expressly designated in
the will or other instrument, and the gift shall become effective immediately
upon death.
2. If the instrument making the gift does not purport to be a will, it shall be
executed by the donor or by some person in his presence and by his direction
and attested in the presence of the donor by two or more credible witnesses. The
instrument shall become immediately effective upon the donor's death, and no
person acting in good faith pursuant to the direction of the instrument and with-
out knowledge of a subsequent revocation thereof shall be liable for so doing,
notwithstanding the subsequent revocation in whole or part by a will, codicil, or
other instrument executed in accordance with this Section.
28
Far-sighted though this section may have been at the time of its
enactment, subsequent events have manifested its limitations. For in-
stance, note the limitations on recipients. Only institutions in the spe-
cified classes may qualify; individuals cannot. Note also that the pur-
poses for which gifts can be made may be somewhat limited in practice.
If we look particularly at the language, "or for use as expressly
designated in the will or other instrument," we can see room for gifts
for purposes of transplantation. The donation, however, can only be
made to institutions. If it were desired to benefit a given individual,
the gift would have to be "in trust" to the institution. Such a "trust,"
which of course is not really a trust because it lacks a res (there be-
ing no "property" in a corpse), is not enforceable.
Nevertheless, the Illinois statute provides a fundamental, if limited,
means for donors to make effective anatomical gifts which cannot be
defeated by their next of kin after their death. Several organizations
in Illinois provide assistance in carrying out such gifts. The Illinois
Society for the Prevention of Blindness has prepared forms, including
cards, for use of donors. The card, designed to be carried on the per-
son of the donor, is meant to overcome the problem of removing critical
tissue, namely the cornea, while it may still be used. A bequest in the
donor's will is advisable also, lest a will be deemed to revoke a gift
executed earlier on the form.
The medical schools in the state have organized a non-profit corpora-
tion to handle gifts for anatomical dissection and study. Entitled Dem-
onstrators Association of Illinois, the corporation also has provided
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 42a (1967). "Statutes have been enacted in 41 jurisdictions
which specifically provide authority for the ante-mortem donations of all or part of a
body for medical, scientific, or therapeutic purposes." Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation
and the Law: The Need for Organized Sensitivity, 57 GEO. L.J. 5 at 17-18 (1968). The
authors have summarized the provisions of all existing statutes in Appendix C to their
article.
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forms specifically to meet the requirements of section 42a of the Pro-
bate Act. A card to be carried on the person is included. 9
An executor in Illinois is given certain statutory powers before the
issuance of letters of office. Among these powers is "the carrying out
of any gift of the decedent's body or any part thereof.""' This provi-
sion in the Probate Act is thus co-ordinated with section 42a and pro-
vides one with authority to make gifts promptly after death. Often
knowledge of the gift, if the next of kin are not aware of it, will be
dependent upon the card carried on the person. The executor is thus
brought in at the earliest stage without having to wait to file the will
and be appointed. Speed is essential and in this way is assured.'
While Illinois law has many desirable features and can be partially
adapted to the needs of transplant operations, what improvements are
suggested by recent experience?
THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on July 30, 1968, the cul-
mination of three years of consultation and drafting. 2 They have
codified for us the benefits of recent transplant experience.
29 Each of the agencies in Illinois is described in Stevens, Planning for the Disposition
of Human Remains, 52 ILL. B.J. 870 (1964). A more specialized agency is the Temporal
Bone Bank at the University of Chicago. Research using inner ear structures from per-
sons who were deaf has been the means of helping the living who cannot hear.
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 79 (1967).
31 As noted, section 79 confers certain pre-appointment powers upon a nominated
executor. Among these is the right to bury the decedent. How is this to be reconciled
with the common law power of the next of kin to bury the decedent? This is all the
more crucial in that we have construed the power to bury as the power of disposition
generally. Absent a direction in the will, does the nominated executor obtain a power of
disposition superior to that of the next of kin? Most American jurisdictions have an-
swered no. This is the conclusion in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 465 at 482 (1952). We could
expect the same rule to prevail in Illinois, especially in light of the Palenzke and Fischer
cases. An interesting case may be found in Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 747 (1964), in which a
testator's gift for research could not he carried out. The next of kin challenged the repre-
sentatives regarding a funeral which had been expressly forbidden in the will. The next of
kin desired a funeral. The representatives, probably at the behest of the residuary legatee,
sought to enjoin it. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire allowed the funeral, since
the medical gift could not be carried out. The court reasoned that since the testator's
purpose failed, the interests of her surviving spouse and children ought to be honored.
Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654, 7 A.L.R.3d 747 (1964).
.2 The Act was approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
on August 7, 1968, at the annual meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The proceedings
were noted in 54 A.B.A.J. at 1026 (1968). For an informed discussion of the medical
and legal problems flowing from present law and how they may be overcome through
ANATOMICAL GIFTS
To briefly summarize the provisions, the Act empowers any compe-
tent person who is eighteen years old to give his body or a part thereof,
such gift to take effect at his death. 3 After death, if the decedent made
no gift, surviving relatives may make gifts according to an order of
priority. If there is disagreement among a class of donor-relatives of
which the donee actually knows, he cannot accept the gift. The gift can
also be made by the relatives immediately before death.34
Recipients may be hospitals, surgeons, or physicians who all may
receive gifts for the purposes of "advancement of medical or dental
science, therapy, or transplantation. '31 In addition, recipients may be
accredited medical or dental schools, or licensed anatomical banks or
storage facilities. Most importantly, a recipient may be an individual
who can receive the gift "for therapy or transplantation needed by
him."3
The gift may be made by will. Probate is not required for a valid
gift. Later invalidity of the will, if such is the case, is disregarded to
the extent that the gift has been accepted and acted upon in good
faith." Further, the gift may be made by another instrument, signed
before two witnesses. Such an instrument may be a card. Delivery of
the instrument is specifically excused, so as to leave no question about
formalities.
If a gift is made without a specified donee, it may be accepted by
the attending physician, as also where the specified donee is for some
reason not available. The physician who accepts the gift is barred from
participating in the transplant operation, including removal of parts. 8
However, a specific surgeon may be designated to perform the opera-
tion."9 If a relative makes a gift, it must be in writing or if by telephone
or otherwise, it must be recorded."
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, see Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23
Bus. LAWYER 919 (1968). Professor Stason was a principal draftsman of the Uniform
Act.
3 THE UNrFORm ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT § 2(a) (1968) (hereinafter cited as Act).
See Appendix for reprint of the Act.
34 § 2(b)-(e).
35 § 3(1).
301d. § 3(4).
3 7 1d. § 4(a).
3 8 1d. § 4(c).
3 9 1d. § 4(d).
4 0 Id. § 4(e).
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Revocation may be by a number of means; for example, by revoking
a will if the gift were made by will. But it also may be by a signed
statement, an oral statement before two witnesses communicated to the
donee, or an oral statement to an attending physician during terminal ill-
ness or injury, even if the original document of gift has been delivered
to the donee.41 To be valid, a revocation after death by a signed state-
ment, if not delivered to the donee, must have been found on the
person of the decedent or in his effects.42
The donee may accept or reject the gift, as well as allow for funeral
services, if appropriate. Removal of a part is to be accomplished with-
out unnecessary mutilation. After removal of parts, custody of the body
returns to those entitled to have it for burial. There is an exoneration
clause to protect those who conform to the Act in good faith, or for
that matter, the similar act of another state. Such a provision prevents
serious conflict of laws problems.4"
A most significant provision is that the time of death is to be deter-
mined by an attending physician who is then barred from participating
in the transplant operation." This is intended to prevent a serious con-
flict of interest. The Act is expressly made subject to the law regarding
autopsies and rights of the coroner.4"
Many features of the Uniform Anatomical Gilt Act recommend
themselves when we consider the less complete law under which we
must operate in Illinois. Giving survivors the powers to make gifts and
establishing a priority among them seem especially valuable. The pri-
ority descends when survivors in a prior class are not available at
death. Further, they must not have actual notice of contrary inten-
tions of the decedent. If the decedent has made it clear that he wished
no gift to be made, the person with actual knowledge of that is barred
from making the gift. It also seems worthwhile to empower survivors
to make the gift "immediately before death." The possible psychologi-
cal difficulties in approaching the donor at such a time are evident. Yet
medical requirements make speed essential if the organs donated are
to be usable. Without some such provision, doctors may be defeated
in their effort to obtain consent. The donor's condition may have de-
41 Id. § 6.
42 Id.
43 Id. § 7.
44 Id.
45id. § 7(d).
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teriorated so that he can no longer give competent consent. Doctors
could resort only to relatives for consent. Until eventual enactment of
the Act, however, relatives cannot usually give consent upon which
doctors can heavily rely.
It is most significant that individuals may be recipients of parts
that they may need. This in itself affords an opportunity to accom-
plish what may be in some cases a vital purpose. But for this power,
some gifts would probably not be made. Another creative feature pro-
vides for a gift to the attending physician for use as he directs.
The more liberal variety of means of revocation should remove in-
hibitive influences which might prevent such gifts. It allows for a
change of mind.
The Commissioners have chosen to omit consideration of some prob-
lems from the Act, adjudging them not to be susceptible to legislative
solutions.46 These are the problems of payment for gifts, of defining
death, and of allocating organs and tissue in precious supply when
several patients may need them.
Payment might very well be harmless. Yet in some cases harm
could result. Physicians have criticized payment on several counts. One
objectionable case involves relatives who, being themselves unwilling
to donate a kidney, seek to pay someone else for a kidney. Certain
donors have blackmailed the recipient or his family. Physicians often
feel it is important that the donor not be subjected to added financial
pressure in reaching a decision.4 7 To allow anything like a "going rate"
to develop would seem to invite trouble. Both the Uniform Act and the
present Illinois statute refer to "gift" in their title, thus making no
attempt to deal in monetary values.
The need for a definition of death has become more acute with the
advent of transplant operations. As aptly stated in one editorial, this is
"the problem of the surgical gardener: Can the transplanter afford to
wait for a dying organ just to be certain that he is not also a surgical
criminal? Can the recipient afford to have him wait? '4 8 The problem
is even more acute in the case of sustaining "life" by artificial means."
Altogether, current developments indicate the advisability of waiting
46 Stason, supra note 32, at 927-29.
47 See DISCUSSION IN ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS: VITH SPECIAL REFERENCE To
TRANSPLANTATION 37 (G. Wolstenholme & M. O'Connor ed. 1966).
48 Editorial, What and When is Death? 204 J. AMER. MED. Ass. 219, 220 (1968).
49 Supra note 47, at 70-74.
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for physicians to refine the standards." Perhaps legislative definitions
will never be adequate or appropriate. The attempt now would clearly
be premature.
The problems of allocation of precious resources have become ever
more disturbing. Before the question of transplantation, there were
questions of dialysis and other procedures limited by economics.
Perhaps the answers must eventually come from panels of qualified
citizens. Many doctors, though, view this problem of allocation as the
question they have always faced-which patient to treat first. They
treat the one most in need who can best benefit from the treatment.'
New attitudes towards the advances of medicine will change still
other attitudes, such as feelings about the body; and in time, public
opinion may become more informed about the seemingly intractible
problems which the advances bring.
Recognition of the need for orientation of the public undoubtedly
prompted the proposal of a Senate Joint Resolution which would
establish a commission to probe the "legal, social, and ethical implica-
tions of medical research." 2
CONCLUSION
The state of the art in transplantation is constantly being advanced
and refined. As it is, we must consider the major question posed in this
50 As examples of the efforts of the profession to come abreast of the problem, see
Halley and Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J. AMER. MED. Ass. 423
(1968), and A Definition of Irreversible Coma, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 J. AMER. MED.
Ass. 337 (1968).
51 Moore et al., Cardiac and Other Organ Transplantation, 206 J. AMER. MED. Ass. 2489
(1968). "By analogy with the other situations, the heart should go to the patient likely
to derive the greatest benefit, that is, to the patient in whom the likelihood of a success-
ful transplant is greatest; and case by case, this must be a medical decision." Id. at 2496.
This reference is a position paper growing out of a conference sponsored by the Amer-
ican College of Cardiology, September 28 and 29, 1968, which included many of the best
informed, most experienced physicians and other professionals associated with transplant
operations.
5 2 S.J. Res., 145 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Note also S. 2882, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968), to provide review of the problems related to transplants, artificial organs, kidney
disease and dialysis (proposing financial support for the latter, as well as training).
One physician, half-humorously, sees the day when -the state will obtain the right to
claim organs at death, having provided public health measures which benefited the body
during life. Warwick, Organ Transplants: A Modest Proposal, Wall Street J., Juine 24,
1968, at 12, col. 3.
Further, on the subject of attitudes and the resulting impediments to advance in the
law, see Diamond, Are We Ready to Leave Our Bodies to the Next Generation? N.Y.
Times, April 21, 1968, § 6 (Magazine) at 26.
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article: Is the legal environment suitable for transplant operations, in
Illinois? Upon comparison with the more complete answers of' the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, we must objectively conclude that
Illinois law, with its many unanswered questions, would be consider-
ably improved by enactment of the Uniform Act.53 Each of the cases
we have considered could have been resolved more easily under its
provisions. Initial reaction from the medical profession favors the
Uniform Act.14 It offers a greater degree of certainty and greater
harmony in the adjustment of all the interests involved: those of
donors and their relatives, those of recipients and their relatives, those
of the medical profession, and those of the public at large.
APPENDIX
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
An act authorizing the gift of all or part of a human body after death for specified
purposes.
SECTION 1. [Definitions.i
(a) "Bank or storage facility" means a facility licensed, accredited or approved under
the laws of any state for storage of human bodies or parts thereof.
(b) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes a stillborn infant or fetus.
(c) "Donor" means an individual who makes a gift of all or part of his body.
(d) "Hospital" means a hospital licensed, accredited or approved under the laws of
any state and includes a hospital operated by the United States government, a state, or
a subdivision thereof, although not required to be licensed under state laws.
(e) "Part" includes organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and
other portions of a human body, and "part" includes "parts".
(f) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government or governmental sub-
division or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association or any other
legal entity.
(g) "Physician" or "surgeon" means a physician or surgeon licensed or authorized
to practice under the laws of any state.
(h) "State" includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession,
and any other area subject to the legislative authority of the United States of America.
SECTION 2. [Persons Who May Execute an Anatomical Gift.]
(a) Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give all or any
part of his body for any purposes specified in Section 3, the gift to take effect upon
death.
53 In their detailed analysis Sadler and Sadler, supra note 28, at 18-28, discuss thirteen
provisions which an adequate act should contain and note in Appendix C, at 41, that
the Illinois act contains only six of them. The Sadlers were consultants to the draftsmen
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and regard it as the workable ideal against which
existing laws should be judged.
54 The position paper, supra note 51, at 2496, endorses the Unijorm Anatomical. Gift
Act. A companion editorial urges enactment, Transplantation, 206 J. AMER. MED. Ass.
2514 (1968).
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(b) Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated, when persons in prior
classes are not available at the time of death, and in the absence of actual notice of
contrary indications by the decedent, or actual notice of opposition by a member of
the same or a prior class, may give all or any part of the decedent's body for any
purposes specified in Section 3:
(1) the spouse,
(2) an adult son or daughter,
(3) either parent,
(4) an adult brother or sister,
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
(6) any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.
(c) If the donee has actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent, or that
a gift by a member of a class is opposed by a member of the same or a prior class, the
donee shall not accept the gift. The persons authorized by this subsection (b) may make
the gift after death or immediately before death.
(d) A gift of all or part of a body authorizes any examination necessary to assure
medical acceptability of the gift for the purposes intended.
(e) The rights of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the rights of others
except as provided by Section 7(d).
SECTION 3. [Persons Who May Become Donees, and Purposes for Which Anatomi-
cal Gifts May be Made.]
The following persons may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts thereof for the
purposes stated:
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation; or
(2) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university for educa-
tion, research, advancement of medical or dental science or therapy; or
(3) any bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation; or
(4) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him.
SECTION 4. [Manner of Executing Anatomical Gifts.]
(a) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2(a) may be made by will. The
gift becomes effective upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate. If
the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the gift,
to the extent that it has been acted upon in good faith, is nevertheless valid and
effective.
(b) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2(a) may also be made by
document other than a will. The gift becomes effective upon the death of the donor. The
document, which may be a card designed to be carried on the person, must be signed
by the donor, in the presence of 2 witnesses who must sign the document in his pres-
ence. If the donor cannot sign, the document may be signed for him at his direction
and in his presence, and in the presence of 2 witnesses who must sign the document in
his presence. Delivery of the document of gift during the donor's lifetime is not neces-
sary to make the gift valid.
(c) The gift may be made to a specified donee or without specifying a donee. If
the latter, the gift may be accepted by the attending physician as donee upon or fol-
lowing death. If the gift is made to a specified donee who is not available at the time
and place of death, the attending physician upon or following death, in the absence of
any expressed indication that the donor desired otherwise, may accept the gift as donee.
The physician who becomes a donee under this subsection shall not participate in the
procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
(d) Notwithstanding Section 7(b), the donor may designate in his will, card or
other document of gift the surgeon or physician to carry out the appropriate procedures.
In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is not available, the donee or other
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person authorized to accept the gift may employ or authorize any surgeon or physician
for the purpose.
(e) Any gift by a person designated in Section 2(b) shall be made by a document
signed by him, or made by his telegraphic, recorded telephonic or other recorded
message.
SECTION 5. [Delivery of Document of Gift.]
If the gift is made by the donor to a specified donee, the will, card or other document,
or an executed copy thereof, may be delivered to the donee to expedite the appropriate
procedures immediately after death, but delivery is not necessary to the validity of the
gift. The will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, may be deposited
in any hospital, bank or storage facility or registry office that accepts them for safe-
keeping or for facilitation of procedures after death. On request of any interested party
upon or after the donor's death, the person in possession shall produce the document
for examination.
SECTION 6. [Amendment or Revocation of the Gift.]
(a) If the will, card or other document or executed copy thereof, has been delivered
to a specified donee, the donor may amend or revoke the gift by:
(1) the execution and delivery to the donee of a signed statement, or
(2) an oral statement made in the presence of 2 persons and communicated to
the donee, or
(3) a statement during a terminal illness or injury addressed to an attending
physician and communicated to the donee, or
(4) a signed card or document found on his person or in his effects.
(b) Any document of gift which has not been delivered to the donee may be re-
voked by the donor in the manner set out in subsection (a) or by destruction, cancella-
tion, or mutilation of the document and all executed copies thereof.
(c) Any gift made by a will may also be amended or revoked in the manner provided
for amendment or revocation of wills, or as provided in subsection (a).
SECTION 7. [Right and Duties at Death.]
(a) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts a gift of the
entire body, he may, subject to the terms of the gift, authorize embalming and the use
of the body in funeral services. If the gift is of a part of the body, the donee, upon
the death of the donor and prior to embalming, shall cause the part to be removed
without unnecessary mutilation. After removal of the part, custody of the remainder of
the body vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin or other persons under obligation to
dispose of the body.
(b) The time of death shall be determined by a physician who attends the donor at
his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. This physician shall not
participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
(c) A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act, or under
the anatomical gift laws of another state [or a foreign country] is not liable for damages
in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act.
(d) The provisions of this Act are subject to the laws of this state prescribing powers
and duties with respect to autopsies.
SECTION 8. [Uniformity of Interpretation:]
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it.
SECTION 9. [Short Title.]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
